Abstract. We develop for set cover games several general cost-sharing methods that are approximately budgetbalanced, core, and/or group-strategyproof. We first study the cost sharing for a single set cover game, which does not have a budget-balanced core. We show that there is no cost allocation method that can always recover more than 1 ln n of the total cost if we require that the total shared cost of any subset of players is no more than the total cost of serving them only, i.e., core. Here n is the number of all players to be served. We give an efficient cost allocation method that always recovers 1 ln dmax of the total cost, where dmax is the maximum size of all sets. We then study the cost allocation scheme for all induced subgames. It is known that no cost sharing scheme can always recover more than 1 n of the total cost for every subset of players. We give an efficient cost sharing scheme that always recovers at least 1 2n of the total cost for every subset of players and furthermore, our scheme is cross-monotone. When the elements to be covered are selfish agents with privately known valuations, we present an approximately efficient strategyproof charging mechanism such that each element maximizes its profit when it reports its valuation truthfully. When the sets are selfish agents with privately known costs, we present a strategyproof payment mechanism in which each set maximizes its profit when it reports its cost truthfully. We also show how to fairly share the payments to all sets among the elements.
Introduction

Generalized Set Cover Problem
Let U = {e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e n } be a finite set, and let S = {S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S m } be a collection of multisets (or sets for short) of U . For each e i ∈ U and each S j ∈ S, we denote the multiplicity of e i in S j by k j,i . Each S j is associated with a cost c j . For any X ⊆ S, let C(X ) denote the total costs of the sets in X , i.e., C(X ) = S j ∈X c j .
For a given k > 0 and a set of element coverage requirements {r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r n }, a k-partial-cover C is defined to be a subset {S j 1 , S j 2 , · · · , S j l } of S such that n i=1 min{r i , l t=1 k j t ,i } ≥ k. The generalized set cover problem is to compute an optimum k-partial-cover C opt with the minimum cost C(C opt ).
This problem becomes the traditional multicover problem [1, 2] when we set k = n i=1 r i and k j,i = 1 for all S j and e i , as each element e i should be fully covered and each set S j is a simple set. When we set r i = 1, it becomes the traditional partial cover problem [3] . This problem is therefore a natural extension of the classic set cover problem by allowing partial cover, multiset, and element coverage requirement greater than 1. Accordingly, the greedy algorithm for this problem is a combination of the algorithms designed for partial cover and multicover [1] [2] [3] .
-There may be a limit k j,i on the number of units of service that a service provider S j can provide to a service receiver e i . For example, each service provider may be a cargo company that is transporting goods to various cities (the service receivers), and the amount of goods that can be transported to a particular city daily is limited by the number of trains/trucks that are going to that city everyday. -Each service receiver e i may have a limit r i on the number of units of service that it desires to receive (and is willing to pay for). -There may be a limit k on the total number of units of service that the service providers shall provide to the service receivers. For example, a manufacturer company hires various cargo companies to distribute the products to various cities daily, and the total number of units of service required is determined by the daily production of the manufacturer company.
The problem can be modeled by the generalized set cover problem defined in Subsection 1.1. There may be different types of games according to various conditions: 1 Each service receiver e i has to receive at least r i units of service, and the costs incurred by the service providers will be shared by the service receivers. 2 Each service receiver e i declares a bid b i,r for the r-th unit of service it shall receive, and is willing to pay for it only if the assigned cost is at most b i,r . 3 Each service provider S j declares a cost c j , and is willing to provide the service only if the payment received is at least c j .
There are different algorithmic issues for these games. For example, for Game 1, we shall define a cost allocation method so that every subset of service receivers feel that the cost they need to pay is "fair" according to certain criteria. For Games 1 and 2, the cost allocation method, by charging service receivers, needs to recover (either entirely or a constant fraction of) the total cost of the chosen service providers. For Games 2 and 3, we need a mechanism (for determining costs charged to service receivers and payments paid to service providers) that can guarantee that the players are truthful with their declaration of bids/costs.
Our Results
We first study how we share the total costs of the selected service providers among the service receivers such that some fairness criteria are met. Let C(S) be the total cost of a set cover for a subset of service receivers S. Let ξ(i, S) be the shared cost of the service receiver i by a cost sharing method ξ. A cost sharing method is called budget-balanced if e i ∈S ξ(i, S) = C(S). Obviously, there are many budget-balanced cost sharing methods. A further criterion is that the sharing method should be fair. While the definition of budget-balance is straightforward, defining fairness is more subtle: many fairness concepts were proposed in the literature, such as max-min [4] , min-max [5] , core and bargaining set [6] . In this paper, we study the fair sharing of cost using the concept of core: for any subset T ⊆ S of players, the total shared cost ei∈T ξ(i, S) is at most the minimum cost of all subsets of service providers covering T . The last criterion for a cost sharing method is cross-monotone: ξ(i, T 1 ) ≤ ξ(i, T 2 ) for any two subsets T 1 and T 2 with T 1 ≥ T 2 . It is easy to show that there is no cost sharing method that can achieve all these three criteria simultaneously. We thus relax the budget-balance criterion to α
-budget-balance: α · C(S) ≤ e i ∈S ξ(i, S) ≤ C(S).
We present a cost sharing method that is is tight. We also present a cost sharing method that is 1 2n -budget-balanced core and cross-monotone, which is almost the optimum [7] .
We then design greedy set cover methods that are cognizant of the fact that the service providers and/or the service receivers are selfish and rational. By "selfish," we mean that they only care about their own benefits without consideration for the global performances or fairness issues. By "rational," we mean that when the methods of computing the output for the set cover game are instituted, they will always choose their actions to maximize their benefits. The study of selfish and rational agents participating in a cooperative or non-cooperative game is central to game theory. Two fundamental concepts in game theory are Nash Equilibrium and dominant strategy. Assume that there are n players. Given a set of actions a = (a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a n ), where player i chooses the action a i , let u(a) = (u 1 (a), u 2 (a), · · · , u n (a)) be the payoffs vector: u i (a) is the payoff (or called profit, benefit) to the player i. An action vector a is called a Nash Equilibrium if no player can unilaterally switch its action to improve its benefit when the actions of other players are fixed. An action a i is called a dominant strategy for player i if it maximizes its payoff regardless of the actions chosen by other players.
When the elements to be covered are selfish agents with privately known valuations, we present an approximately efficient strategyproof charging mechanism such that each element maximizes its profit when it reports its valuation truthfully. When the sets are selfish agents with privately known costs, we present a strategyproof payment mechanism in which each set maximizes its profit when it reports its cost truthfully. We also show how to fairly share the payments to all sets among the elements.
Organization of Paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give the exact definitions of the fair cost sharing method and the mechanism design. In Section 3, we study how to fairly share the cost of the service providers among the covered service receivers when the receivers must receive the service. We then show in Section 4 how to charge the cost of service providers to the selfish service receivers when each receiver has a valuation on the r-th cover received. We then show in Section 5 how we compensate the service providers, when they are selfish and each has a privately known cost, such that each service provider maximizes its benefit when it declares its true cost. We conclude our paper in Section 6. Appendix contains some omitted proofs.
Preliminaries and Prior Art
Preliminaries
Algorithm Mechanism Design: Assume that there are n agents. Each agent i, for i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, has some private information t i , called its type. All agents' types define a type vector t = (t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t n ). A mechanism defines, for each agent i, a set of strategies A i . For each strategy vector a = (a 1 , · · · , a n ), i.e., agent i plays a strategy a i ∈ A i , the mechanism computes an output o = O(a 1 , · · · , a n ) and a payment vector P(a) = (p 1 , · · · , p n ), where p i = P i (a 1 , · · · , a n ) is the amount of money given to the participating agent i. For each possible output o, agent i's preferences are given by a valuation function v i that assigns a real monetary number
) denote the utility of agent i at the outcome (o, p) of the game, given its preferences t i and strategy profile a = (a 1 , · · · , a n ) selected by all agents. A common assumption in mechanism design literature, and one which we will follow in this paper, is that agents are rational and have quasi-linear utility functions. The utility function is It is well-known that it suffices to design a direct-revelation mechanism in which the only actions available to agents are to make direct claims about their preferences v i to the mechanism. A mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if reporting valuation truthfully is a dominant strategy. Another very common requirement in the literature for mechanism design is so called individual rationality or voluntary participation: the agent's utility of participating in the output of the mechanism is not less than the utility of the agent if it did not participate at all. For convenience, let 
A mechanism is called truthful or strategyproof if it satisfies both IC and IR properties. To make the mechanism tractable, the output method O(), and the payment method P() should be computable in polynomial time.
where OP T (t) is the output that maximizes the total valuations of all players.
Obviously for the set cover game, we cannot design an o(ln n)-efficient polynomial-time computable strategyproof mechanism unless N P ⊂ DT IM E(n log log n ) [2] .
Cost Sharing: Consider a set U of n players. For a subset S ⊆ U of players, let C(S) be the cost of providing service to S. Here C(S) could be the minimum cost, denoted by OPT(S), or the cost computed by some algorithm A, denoted by A(S). We always assume that the cost function C(S) is cohesive, i.e., for any two disjoint subsets S 1 and
. A cost sharing scheme is simply a function ξ(i, S) with ξ(i, S) = 0 for i ∈ S, for every set S ⊆ U of players. An obvious criterion is that the sharing method should be fair. While the definition of budget-balance is straightforward, defining fairness is more subtle: many fairness concepts were proposed in the literature, such as max-min [4] , min-max [5] , core and bargaining set [6] . Typically, the following three properties are required by a cost sharing scheme.
Equivalently, if we divide the shares by α, we would require that the total cost shares of all agents are at least the cost of providing the service, but do not exceed When only the first two conditions are satisfied, we call the cost sharing scheme to be in the α-core. When each player i has a valuation v i on getting the service, a mechanism should first decide the output of the game (who will get the service), and then decide what is the share of each selected player (what is the payment method). It is wellknown that a cross-monotone cost sharing scheme implies a group-strategyproof mechanism [8] . Notice that the crossmonotone property is not the necessary condition for group-strategyproof. Naturally, several additional properties are required for a cost sharing scheme when every player has a valuation on getting the service. such that player i is guaranteed to get the service when its bid is at least τ i .
Prior Arts on Cost Sharing and Algorithm Mechanism Design
Routing has been an important part of the algorithmic mechanism-design from the very beginning. Strategyproof unicast and the efficient computing of the payment were addressed in [9] [10] [11] [12] . Several results were proposed in the literature to deal with multicast in selfish networks. Feigenbaum et al. [13] , by assuming a fixed multicast structure, designed a strategyproof mechanism that selects a subset of receivers (each with a privately known willing payment) and then shares the cost of the multicast tree providing the service among the selected receivers so budget-balance is achieved. Maximizing profit in strategyproof multicast was studied in [14, 15] . Sharing the cost of the multicast structure among receivers was studied in [16, 13, 8, [17] [18] [19] [20] so some fairness is accomplished. Although the traditional set cover problem (without multisets and partial-cover requirement) can be viewed as a special case of multicast, several results were proposed specifically for set cover in selfish environment. Devanur et al. [21] studied, for the set cover game and facility location game, how the cost of shared resource is to be distributed among its users in a way such that revealing the true valuation is a dominant strategy for each user. Their cost sharing method is not in the core of the game. One of the open questions left in [21] is to design a strategyproof cost sharing method for multicover game in which the bidders might want to get covered multiple times. Pal and Tardos [22] gave a cost sharing method that can recover 1 3 of the total cost for facility location game, and recently, Immorlica et al. [7] showed that this is the best achievable upper bound for any cross-monotonic cost sharing method.
Cost Sharing Among Unselfish Service Receivers
In this section, we study how to share the cost of the service providers among a given set of service receivers. For this scenario, it is difficult to find realistic examples where a partial cover is desired. Therefore, in the remainder of this section, we only consider the multiset multicover problem, i.e., k = n i=1 r i . However, the results presented in this section can easily be generalized to the partial cover case, should such a scenario arise.
α-Core
Given a subset of elements X, let OPT(X) denote the cost of an optimum cover C opt (X) of X. This cost function clearly is cohesive: for every partition
that specifies for each element e i ∈ U the share x i ≥ 0 of the total cost of serving U that e i shall pay.
Ideally, when the set of elements to be covered is fixed to be U , we want the cost allocation x to be budgetbalanced and fair, i.e., being in core. However, the following simple example shows that there is no budget-balanced core for the set-cover game. Let U be {1, 2, 3} and the sets be S 1 = {1, 2}, S 2 = {1, 3}, and S 3 = {2, 3} with costs 2, 2 and 2 respectively. For any allocation x = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } we have x 1 + x 2 + x 3 = 4 (from the budget-balance condition), x 1 + x 2 ≤ 2, x 1 + x 3 ≤ 2, and x 2 + x 3 ≤ 2 (from the core requirement). This is clearly impossible. We then relax the notion of budget-balance to the notion of α-budget-balance for some α ≤ 1, which means that
We have the following result about the achievable α-core (see appendix for proof).
Theorem 1. For the generalized set cover game, there is no cost allocation method that is
We then give a cost allocation method that can recover 1 ln dmax of the total cost OPT(U ) for a multicover game, where
The basic approach of our cost allocation method is as follows. We first run a greedy algorithm (see Algorithm 1) to find a set cover C grd with an approximation ratio of ln d max for the generalized set cover game. Starting with C grd = ∅, the greedy algorithm adds sets to C grd one at a time. After the s-th round, we define the remaining required coverage r i of an element e i to be r i − s t =1 k j t ,i . For any S j ∈ C grd , the effective coverage k j,i of e i by S j is defined to be min{k j,i , r i }, the value v j of S j is defined to be n i=1 k j,i , and the effective average cost of S j is defined to be cj v j . Algorithm 1 Greedy algorithm for multiset multicover problem.
pick the set S t in S \ C grd with the minimum effective average cost. 5:
for all e i ∈ U do 7:
The greedy algorithm will select a set S j with the least effective average cost. For any e i and r such that
We will show that x is indeed a 1 ln dmax -core.
Theorem 2. The above-defined cost allocation x is a
Recall that the core we defined in this paper, given a set of players U , required that the total cost sharing ei∈T ξ(i, U ) of a subset of elements T is at most the optimum cost of providing service to elements in T . For a set cover game, clearly it is NP-hard to find the optimum cost of covering T . Naturally, one may define the α-core as follows: a cost sharing method
for every subset of elements T ⊆ U . Even we relax the definition of the core to this, we can still prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.
There is no cost sharing method that is a relaxed α-core for the cost function computed by the greedy algorithm, where α = o( 1 ln n ).
Cross-monotone α-Core
Recall that the definition of α-budget-balance only requires that
(i, S) ≤ OPT(T ) for any subsets T and S with T ⊆ S, and (3) ξ(i, S) ≤ ξ(i, T ) for any two subsets T and S with i ∈ T ⊂ S.
Clearly, if a cost sharing scheme is cross-monotone α-core then every cost allocation method ξ(·, S) induced on a subset S of players is always α-core, but the reverse is not true. Directly from Theorem 1, we know that there is no cost sharing scheme for the set cover game that is cross-monotone α-core for α = 1 ln n . Recently, Immorlica et al. [7] claimed the following result. Theorem 4. [7] For set cover game, there is no cost sharing scheme that is cross-monotone α-core for α = 1 n + .
In the remainder of this section, we show that this bound is almost tight for generalized set cover games: there exists a cross-monotone cost sharing scheme ξ(i, S) that can recover 1 2n of the total cost. Further, the bound is tight for set cover games without multisets (but still allowing multicover requirements): there exists a cross-monotone cost sharing scheme ξ(i, S) that can recover 1 n of the total cost. Our cost sharing scheme, for each element e i , finds the set with the minimum cost ratio to cover e i , then updates the covering requirement and then repeats the above process till the covering requirement is satisfied. We assume that each set S j is selected to cover the element e i Y (i, j) times. The cost c j is proportionally shared by the elements covered by S j : an element e i will share
1≤i≤n Y (i,j) fraction. We then describe our cost sharing scheme in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Cross-monotone cost sharing for multiset multicover game.
1: Assume that the set of elements to be covered is
Here Y (i, j) will store how many cover requirements of element ei are provided by set S j . ζ(i, j) = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Here ζ(i, j) will store the fraction cost of set S j shared by the element e i . 3: Set CA ← ∅. 4: for all element e i ∈ T do 5:
Set r i ← ri; 6:
Find the set S t with the minimum ratio min
for all element e i ∈ T do 13:
Set
Theorem 5. The cost sharing scheme ξ(·, ·) defined by Algorithm 2 is a cross-monotone
We show by an example that the bound 1 2n is tight for Algorithm 2. Assume that there are n·r+1 sets S
with r copies of e i ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and a set S 0 = {e 1 , · · · , e 1 , · · · e n , · · · , e n } (S 0 has r copies of each element e i ) with the following costs (1) the cost of each set S j is 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n · r and j = 0 mod r, (2) the cost of each set S j is r(1 + ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n · r and j = 0 mod r, and (3) the cost of S 0 is r(1 + 2 ). Assume that the cover requirement of each element e i is r i = r. It is not difficult to show that Algorithm 2 will pick all these sets except S 0 to cover r copies of e i and the total cost of picked sets are n(r − 1) + n · r(1 + ). The optimum solution is to use the set S 0 only with cost r(1 + 2 ). The ratio
could be arbitrarily close to 2n by selecting sufficiently large r and sufficiently small . There is still a gap between the above result and the upper bound [7] . However, by dropping the multiset assumption, it is not difficult to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6. The cost sharing scheme ξ(·, ·) defined by Algorithm 2 is cross-monotone
1 n -core for set cover game when every set S j is a simple set.
Cost Sharing Among Selfish Service Receivers
In Section 3 we assumed that all elements (service receivers) are unselfish and all their coverage requirements are to be satisfied. In this section, we consider the problem of selecting service providers under the constraint of a collection of bids
. This is often true in realistic situations: the marginal valuations are usually decreasing. A bid b i,r will be served (and the subsequent bid b i,r+1 will be considered) only if b i,r ≥ price(i, r), where price(i, r) is the cost to be paid by e i for its r-th coverage. Further, in this scenario we may also consider partial cover, as the total number of units of service available may be limited by a constant k.
We use a greedy algorithm (see Algorithm 3) similar to the one for the traditional set cover game [21] . Informally speaking, we start with y = 0, where y is the cost to be shared by each bid served. We raise y until there exists a set S j whose cost can be sufficiently covered by the element copies in S j , if each element copy needs to pay y. To adapt to the multiset multicover scenario, we make the following changes:
-For any set S j ∈ C grd and any e i such that k j,i > 0, we define the alive bids of e i with respect to S j to be B See appendix for proof. In [21] multicover game (although with traditional set) was also considered. However, the algorithm used is different from ours and also they did not assume that the bids by the same element are non-increasing, and their mechanism is not strategyproof. for all S j ∈ C grd and ei ∈ Sj S j ;
Selfish Service Providers
In the previous sections, we studied how the costs of the service providers are shared among service receivers such that approximate budget-balance and some fairness are achieved. The underline assumption made so far is that the service providers are truthful in revealing their costs of providing the service. In this section, we will address the scenario when service providers are selfish in revealing their costs.
Strategyproof Mechanism
Remember that in the generalized set cover problem, there is a set U of n elements that need to be covered: each element e i need to be covered r i times, and each agent 1 ≤ j ≤ m can cover a subset of elements S j with a cost c j . Let c = (c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c m ). We want to find a subset of agents D such that j∈D S j has r i copies of element e i for every element e i ∈ U . The social efficiency of the output D is j∈D c j , which is the objective function to be minimized. Clearly a VCG mechanism [23] [24] [25] can be applied if we can find the subset of S that satisfies the multicover requirement of elements in U with the minimum cost. Unfortunately this is NP-hard. We showed that the greedy method presented in Algorithm 1 has an approximation ratio of ln d max .
Let C grd (S, c, U, r) be the sets selected from S (with cost specified by a cost vector c = (c 1 , · · · , c m )) by the greedy algorithm to cover elements in U with cover requirement specified by a vector r = (r 1 , · · · , r n ) (see Algorithm 1) . Notice that the output set is a function of S, c, U , and r. The type of an agent could be each set c j , i.e., the elements in S j are assumed to be a public knowledge. Here, we consider a more general case: the type of an agent is (S j , c j ) . In other words, we assume that every service provider j could lie not only about its cost c j but also about the elements it could cover. This problem now looks very similar to the combinatorial auction with single minded bidder studied in [26] , but with the following differences: in the set cover problem here we want to cover all the elements with at least a given cover requirement and the sets chosen can have some overlap while in combinatorial auction we want to maximize the sum of the cost of all sets and the chosen sets are disjoint.
Assume that we use Algorithm 1 to find a set cover, and want to apply VCG mechanism to compute the payment to the selected agents. The payment to an agent j is 0 if S j ∈ C grd . Otherwise, the payment to a set S j ∈ C grd is
Here C(X) is the total cost of the sets in X for X ⊆ S. We show that this payment scheme based on VCG is not truthful by the following example. Consider the universal set U = {e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e n } and S = {S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S n+1 }, where S i = {e i } for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and S n+1 = {e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e n }. The cost c i = 1 n−i+1 , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and c n+1 = 1+ , where is a small positive number. It is easy to show that the payment to agent 1 is P V CG 1 = 1 + − H n + 1/n, which is less than its cost 1/n. In other words, the mechanism M = (C grd , P V CG ) is not truthful. For the moment, we assume that agent j won't be able to lie about its element S j . We will drop this assumption later. Clearly, the greedy set cover method presented in Algorithm 1 satisfies a monotone property: if a set S j is selected with a cost c j , then it is still selected with a cost less than c j . Monotonicity guarantees that there exists a strategyproof mechanism for generalized set cover games using the greedy method to compute its output. We then show how to compute the payment to each service provider efficiently. We assume that for any set S j , if we remove S j from S, S still satisfies the coverage requirements of all elements in U . Otherwise, we call the set cover problem to be monopoly: the set S j can charge an arbitrarily large cost in the monopoly game. The following presents our strategyproof mechanism for multiset multicover set cover problem. It is easy to show that P grd j computed by Algorithm 4 is the threshold cost for set S j such that it is selected in the greedy set cover iff it reports a cost less than P grd j . Thus, the mechanism M = (C grd , P grd ) is strategyproof (when the agent j does not lie about the set S j of elements it can cover) and the payment P grd j is the minimum payment to the selfish service provider j among any strategyproof mechanism using the greedy set cover method described in Algorithm 1 as its output.
Algorithm 4 Strategyproof payment
We now consider the scenario when agent j can lie about S j also. Assume that agent j cannot lie upward 3 , i.e., it can only report a S j ⊆ S j . We argue that agent j will not lie about its elements S j . Notice that the value κ(j, s) computed for the s-th round is κ(j, s) =
Obviously v j cannot increase when agent j reports any set S j ⊆ S j . Thus, lying its set to a smaller set S j will not improve its payment.
Theorem 8. Algorithm 1 and 4 together define a ln d max -efficient strategyproof mechanism M = (C grd , P
grd ) for multiset multicover set cover game.
Notice that so far we assumed that each set S j is an individual agent. In practice, it is possible that a selfish agent controls several different sets in S. Assume that there are g agents {1, 2, · · · , g}. Each agent i controls a subset S i ⊂ S such that g i=1 S i = S, and S i ∩ S j = ∅ for i = j. We still use Algorithm 1 to find a greedy set cover. Assume that we want to compute a payment to a set S j owned by agent a. The payment computing algorithm has to be changed as follows: the line 4 of Algorithm 4 is replaced by "pick the set S t in S − C grd − S a with the minimum effective average cost".
Sharing the Payment Fairly
In the previous subsection, we only define what is the payment to a selfish service provider S j . A remaining question is how the payment should be charged. A natural way is to charge the payments to all service receivers fairly (under some subtle definitions) to encourage cooperation among service receivers. One easy way of defining fair payment sharing is to extend the fair cost sharing method. Consider a strategyproof mechanism M = (O, P). Let P(T ) be the total payment to the selfish service providers when T is the set of service receivers to be covered. A payment sharing scheme is simply a function π(i, T ) such that π(i, T ) = 0 for any element e i ∈ T . A payment sharing scheme is called α-budget-balanced if α · P(T ) ≤ e i ∈T π(i, T ) ≤ P(T ). A payment sharing scheme is said to be a core if e i ∈S π(i, T ) ≤ P(S) for any subset S ⊂ T . A payment sharing scheme is said to be a α-core if it is α-budget-balanced and it is a core.
Let us first consider the strategyproof payment method P grd . We first prove the following theorem.
Theorem 9.
There is no α-core payment sharing scheme for the payment method
It is easy to show that if we share the payment to a service provider equally among all service receivers covered by this set, the scheme is not in the core of the game. We leave it as an open problem whether we can design an α-core payment sharing scheme for the payment P grd with α = O( 1 ln n ). In the next, we study the cross-monotone payment sharing scheme. A payment sharing scheme is said to be crossmonotone if π(i, T ) ≤ π(i, S) for any two subsets S ⊂ T and i ∈ S. A payment sharing scheme is said to be a cross-monotone α-core if it is α-budget-balanced, it is a core, and it is cross-monotone.
Similar to Theorem 4, we propose the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1
For the strategyproof mechanism M = (C grd , P grd ) of a set cover game, there is no payment sharing scheme π(·, ·) that is cross-monotone α-core for α = 1 n + .
In the remaining of this section we will present a cross-monotone budget-balanced payment sharing scheme for a strategyproof payment scheme of the set cover game. Our payment sharing scheme is coupled with the following payment scheme. The strategyproof mechanism uses the output called least cost set: for each service receiver e i , we find the service provider S j with the least cost efficiency c j min(ri,kj,i) to cover the element e i . New cost efficient sets are found till the cover requirement of e i is satisfied. The output method of the mechanism is described in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Least cost set greedy for multiset multicover game.
while r i > 0 do 5:
Let r i ← r i − min(k j,i , r i ).
7:
Let C lcs ← C lcs ∪ {St}.
We then show how we define the mechanism M = (C lcs , P lcs ). The payment, denoted by p i j , of an element e i to a selected set S j is the largest cost that S j can declare while S j is still selected to cover e i . If the set S j is not selected to cover e i , then p i j = 0. The final payment to a set S j is defined as P lcs j = max ei∈U p i j . We call this mechanism as the least cost set mechanism. Algorithm 6 describes our payment method using Algorithm 5 to compute the output. Let r i ← ri; 4:
Find the set S t = S j with the minimum ratio min
Let C lcs ← C lcs ∪ {S t } and s←s + 1; We then study how we charge the service receivers so that a budget-balance is achieved and the charging scheme also is fair under some concepts. Notice that, given a subset of elements T , we can view the total payments P(T ) to all service providers covering T as a "cost" to T . The payment computed by mechanism M = (C lcs , P lcs ) clearly is cohesive. Then naturally, we could use the cost-sharing schemes studied before to share this special cost among elements. However, it is easy to show by example that the previous cost-sharing schemes (studied in Section 3) are not in the core and also not cross-monotone.
Roughly speaking, our payment sharing scheme works as follows. Notice that a final payment to a set S j is the maximum of payments p i j by all elements. Since different elements may have different value of payment to set S j , the final payment P lcs j should be shared proportionally to their values, not equally among them as cost-sharing. Without loss of generality, assume that 0 ≤ p
is then equally shared among the last n − i + 1 elements, which have the largest n − i + 1 payments to S j .
Our payment sharing method applies to a more general cost function. A cost function P is said to be maximumview cost (MV cost) if it is defined as P j = max e i ∈U p i j where p i j is the view of the cost of set S j by element e i . Obviously, the traditional cost c is a MV cost function by setting p i j = c j for each element e i . The payment function P lcs is also a MV cost function.
Algorithm 7
Sharing MV cost P among receivers. 
are the sorted list of payments in an incremental order.
4:
For elements e σ (1) ,
. Here we assume that p σ(0) j = 0. Update the payment sharing as follows:
is the final payment sharing of service receiver e i .
A service receiver is called free-rider in a payment sharing scheme if its shared total payment is no more than 1 n of its total payment it has to pay if it acts alone. Notice that, when a service receiver acts alone, the same mechanism is applied to compute the payment to the service providers.
Theorem 11. The payment sharing scheme described in Algorithm 7 is budget-balanced, cross-monotone, in the core and does not permit free-rider.
Conclusion
We studied the cost sharing and the strategyproof mechanism for various set cover games. We gave an efficient cost allocation method that always recovers 1 ln d max of the total cost, where d max is the maximum size of all sets. We further gave an efficient cost sharing scheme that is 1 2n -budget-balanced, core and cross-monotone. When the elements to be covered are selfish agents with privately known valuations, we presented a strategyproof charging mechanism. When the sets are selfish agents with privately known costs, we presented two strategyproof payment mechanisms in which each set maximizes its profit when it reports its cost truthfully. We also showed how to fairly share the payments to all sets among the elements.
There are a number of open questions left for future research. Are the bounds on the α-budget-balanced cost sharing schemes tight, although we proved that they are asymptotically tight? Consider the strategyproof mechanism M = (C grd , P grd ). Is there a payment sharing method that is 1 ln n -core? Is there a payment sharing method that is cross-monotone PROOF. It suffices to prove this for the traditional set cover game, where k = n and r i = 1 for all e i . We will build a connection between the cost allocation for a set cover game and the solution to the dual of the LP for set cover problem. Let the non-negative integer y j ∈ {0, 1} denote whether the set S j is selected in C opt (U ). Then we can represent the set cover problem as the following integer programming (IP): Z IP = min m j=1 y j c j subject to (1) m j=1 y j · k j,i ≥ 1 for every element e i ∈ U , and (2) y j ∈ {0, 1}.
To maximize the α for an α-core allocation is equivalent to maximize n i=1 x i subject to e i ∈T x i ≤ OPT(T ) for every subset T ⊆ U . Clearly the maximum value achieved above is at most the maximum value achieved by the following linear programming (LP): Z * LP = max n i=1 x i subject to ei∈S x i ≤ OPT(S) for every S ∈ S. This LP is obviously a dual of the relaxed IP for set cover problem. It is well-known that the integrality gap of set cover problem is
. Thus, there is a set cover game such that the total recovered cost of an α-core is at most PROOF. We first show that e i ∈X x i ≤ OPT(X) for every subset X ⊆ U . We prove this as follows. For our convenience, we assume that
be the cover of U computed by the greedy algorithm. We order the sets in C grd according to the order they are added into C grd .
For each element e i ∈ X, we give the r i copies of e i covered by C grd distinct labels e i,1 , e i,2 , · · · , e i,ri , respectively, according to the order they are covered by C grd . Each element copy e i,r ∈ S j t is assigned with a cost
where price(i, r) is equal to the effective average cost cj t v j t of S j t at the time S j t is added into C grd . Therefore, to prove that ei∈X x i ≤ OPT(X), we need to show that ei∈X
For any set S j ∈ C opt (X) and any element e i ∈ U , we give the k j,i copies of e i in S j distinct labels e i,r becomes "obsolete" (i.e., no longer useful). For example, if r i = 3 and k j,i = 2, the first copy of e i in S j becomes obsolete after C grd has covered e i twice, because now only one element copy of e i is needed to satisfy the coverage requirement of e i .
For each 1 ≤ j ≤ l, we place all the element copies of S j into an array L j according to the above-defined lexicographic order. If O(e The proof technique is to uniquely "charge" each e i,r for e i ∈ X by an element copy e
i,r in some array L j such that the associated cost of e (j) i,r is no less than price(i, r). To do that, we maintain a pointer for each array L j to identify the next element copy that will become "obsolete" (that is, it is no longer useful). Initially, the pointer is pointing to the first element copy in L j . After the t -th round, the pointer will move to the first element copy in L j whose lexicographic order is greater than t .
At the t -th round, we examine all useful element copies of X in S j t (in the increasing order of the element indices) as if they are added into C grd one by one. Suppose e j,r is the element copy currently being examined. Note that here r ≤ r j as we have already excluded the useless element copies from C grd .
Right before e i,r is added into C grd , the pointer of each array containing at least one copy of e i must be pointing to a copy of e i . Once e i,r is added into C grd , we have the following two different cases regarding the movements of these pointers:
Case 1: no pointer is moved. This happens if and only if r i ≥ max 1≤j≤l k j,i . We will charge e i,r to a element copy in some L j in a later round (see Case 2).
Case 2: p pointers are moved. Let e i,r , e i,r +1 , · · · , e i,r be the previously uncharged element copies of e i . We assign each of e i,r , e i,r +1 , · · · , e i,min{r,r +p} to a pointer move in this round (and leave the remaining uncharged element copies, if r +p < r, to the future rounds). For any e i,s , r ≤ s ≤ min{r, r +p}, let L j [q] be the corresponding pointer move (i.e., L j [q] is the element copy to which the pointer was pointing to before moving). Assume that e i,s was covered when S i t was added into C grd . Since set S j has not been selected into C grd before this round, according to the selection criterion of the greedy algorithm we know that the effective average cost of S j is no less than that of S i t when S i t was added into C grd . The effective average cost of S j is no less than c j /(|S j | − q), as at the start of the t -th round there are at least |S j | − q useful element copies in S j . The effective average cost of S i t is exactly price(i, r). Therefore, we have c j /(|S j | − q) ≥ price(i, s).
When the r i -th copy of e i is covered by C grd , all element copies of e i in arrays L 1 , L 2 , · · · , L l have become obsolete. Since l j=1 e j,i ≥ r i , all useful element copies of e i should have been charged. Therefore, the total associated cost of all useful element copies of X in C grd should be no more than the total associated cost of all element copies in the arrays
It remains to show that x is 1 ln dmax -budget-balanced. Let GRD(U ) be the total cost of C grd computed by the greedy algorithm. Obviously,
. This finishes the proof.
Theorem 3 There is no cost sharing method that is a relaxed α-core for the cost function computed by the greedy algorithm, where α = o( 1 ln n ). PROOF. We prove this by presenting an example here. The key idea behind this example is that C grd (U ) = H n ·C opt (U ) and for a particular subset T ⊂ U , C grd (T ) = C opt (T ). There are n elements U = {e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e n } and n + 1 sets:
with cost c n = 1 − , and S n+1 = {e n−1 , e n } with cost c n+1 =
Consider a subset T = {e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e n−1 } of elements. Clearly, the greedy cover will be C grd (T ) = {S n } with total cost 1 − . Assume that x = (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ) is a cost allocation method that is a relaxed α-core. Then this requires that
Theorem 5 The cost sharing scheme ξ(·, ·) defined by Algorithm 2 is a cross-monotone 1 2n -core. PROOF. We have to prove that the cost-sharing scheme is 1 2n -budget-balanced for every T ⊆ U and monotone. Cross-monotone Property: First of all, the cost sharing scheme ξ(·, ·) is cross-monotone because adding new element covering requirements (from covering a set elements T to covering a set of elements S ⊃ T ) will not affect Y (i, j) for element e i ∈ T . It will only change Y (i, j) (for element e i in S − T ) from 0 to positive. Thus, ρ j of a set S j cannot increase when S instead of T is to be covered. Consequently, ξ (i, T ) ≥ ξ (i, S) for any i ∈ T ⊂ S. This implies that ξ is cross-monotone. 2n -budget-balance Property: It is easy to show that ei∈T ξ (i, T ) is the total cost of all sets C A that are selected to cover some element in T . Given a set T of elements to be covered, let C opt (T ) be the optimum set cover with the minimum cost. In the remainder of the proof, we will only consider an element e i ∈ T . Let S a1 , S a2 , · · · , S ax be the sets selected by Algorithm 2 to cover element e i in this order. In other words, every set S aj (1 ≤ j < x) provides the maximum coverage Y (i, a j ) = k a j ,i to element e i ; while the set S a x provides a coverage
to element e i . Let S b1 , S b2 , · · · , S by be the sets in the optimum solution C opt (T ) that satisfies the cover requirement of the element e i . We will show that the total cost of the sets in X a = {S a1 , S a2 , · · · , S ax } is at most twice of the total cost of the sets in
In other words, we will first prove that
Let X be the common sets (except the set S ax if it is a common set) in X a and
For the moment, we assume that the cover requirement of the element e i isr i and the set of sets to be chosen from is S = S − X. Clearly X a − X is still the set of sets selected by Algorithm 2 In Theorem 2 we showed that ei∈U x i ≤ OPT(U ) for the cost allocation method defined in Section 3. Recall that, for Theorem 2, in order to make the cost allocation method ln 
However, we still need to modify the proof of Theorem 2 to take into consideration the introduction of bids. It is easy to see that C grd (B ) = C grd (B). In other words, if the collection of bids given is B instead of B, Algorithm 3 will still pick exactly the same set of sets (with the exactly same order). With B as the set of bids to be served, since eventually every bid of B is served, this problem is the same as the set cover game without bids. Therefore, we have C(C grd (B)) = C(C grd (B )) ≤ ln d max · C (C opt (B ) ).
Now we prove that the mechanism is strategyproof. Recall that the profit of e i is defined to be the total value of all served bids of e i minus the total cost e i has to pay. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that element e i can benefit (i.e., achieve a higher profit) from lying about its truthful bids. Among these "profit-increasing" lies, let Otherwise e i does not need to lie about its q-th bid, a contradiction to the assumption that B i is the most truthful lie. We claim that e i will not benefit from this. First of all, e i will gain less profit in S j because now S j serves less bids and thus the cost shared by each bid is increased. Further, by Lemma 2, bids b i,r 3 , b i,r 3 +1 , · · · , b i,r 2 will not be served by C grd in later rounds, and thus e i cannot make any more profit. Therefore, it is more advantageous for e i to bid truthfully. -Subcase 1.b: When e i is truthful, bid b i,q is not served by any S t ∈ C grd . Since b i,q < b i,q , bid b i,q cannot be served either, and therefore there is no point for e i to lie about its q-th bid. "squeezed" into S j (otherwise a contradiction to the "most truthful lie" assumption). We claim that this is not a profit-increasing strategy. First of all, clearly e i will have a deficit (negative profit) with the bids served by S j , as the exact reason that b i,r 2 +1 , b i,r 2 +2 , · · · , b i,r 3 are not chosen to be served by S j when e i is truthfully bidding is that ( r 3 r=r1 b i,r )/(r 3 −r 1 +1) < price(i, q). Secondly, the bids served in later rounds will not bring any profit to e i either. This is because the shared cost of later rounds will be no less than price(i, q), while b i,r ≤ b i,r 3 < price(i, q) for all r > r 3 . -Subcase 2.b: When e i is truthful, bid b i,q is not served by any S t ∈ C grd . By reporting b i,q instead of b i,q , e i may get its q-th bid served by a set S t selected into C grd earlier than S t is. Similar to Subcase 2.a, we can show that e i is profit-losing in the t -th round while making no profit in later rounds.
This finishes the proof.
Theorem 9 There is no α-core payment sharing scheme for the payment method P grd for α = o( 1 ln n ). PROOF. Consider the example used in the proof of Theorem 3: we duplicate every set used in that example with the same cost. It is easy to show that P grd (U ) = H n−1 − 1 + Theorem 10 The mechanism M = (C lcs , P lcs ) is 1 2n -efficient and strategyproof. PROOF. The proof that the mechanism is 1 2n -efficient can be directly derived from the proof of Theorem 5. To show that it is strategyproof, we first show that the payment to a set S j is indeed the largest possible cost it could declare while it is still selected by Algorithm 5. This can be easily verified from the description of our method. Then we show that a set agent j cannot lie its cost c j to improve its payment. When it is not selected originally, we have c j ≥ P lcs j . If it lies a cost larger than P lcs j , its profit does not change; If it lies a cost smaller than P lcs j , its profit becomes negative: P lcs j − c j . Similarly, when it is originally selected, lying cannot improve its profit. This finishes the proof.
Theorem 11 The payment sharing scheme described in Algorithm 7 is budget-balanced, cross-monotone, and in the core. Furthermore, it does not permit free-rider.
